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A Proposal to Allow the Presentation 
of Mitigation in Juvenile Court so that 
Juvenile Charges May be Expunged in 
Appropriate Cases 
 
Katherine I. Puzone1 
 
“Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control 
over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a 
greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape 
negative influences in their whole environment.”2 
 
Justice Kennedy writing for the majority in Roper v. 
Simmons 
 
Many people believe that juvenile adjudications of 
delinquency are automatically expunged upon the youth 
reaching the age of majority.  In reality, a juvenile adjudication 
of delinquency—especially for a felony—can significantly limit a 
teenager’s future ability to obtain student loans and 
scholarships, join the military, participate in athletics, become a 
firefighter or a law enforcement officer or obtain one of many 
jobs.  As discussed herein, the majority of youth facing charges 
in delinquency court are suffering from severe socio-economic 
deprivation, are victims of emotional, physical or sexual abuse, 
or have serious mental health issues. Many youth caught up in 
the delinquency system are impacted by more than one of these 
factors, each of which places a teenager at significantly greater 
risk of engaging in delinquent behavior.  Society tells these 
young people to “pull themselves up by their bootstraps,” but at 
the same time significantly limits their ability to do just that by 
labeling them felons—often violent felons—for the rest of their 
 
1. Associate Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas 
School of Law, J.D., cum laude, New York University School of Law, M. Phil. 
University of Cambridge, B.A. Trinity College. 
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
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lives.  This article argues that effectively foreclosing a young 
person’s future based upon behavior that is linked to 
circumstances beyond their control violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual punishment.  
This article proposes an alternative framework that allows 
young people to have their juvenile records expunged if they 
fulfill certain criteria.  This would benefit society as well as the 
young defendants, as it would lower the levels of adult 
recidivism. 
This article proposes to add a new procedure in juvenile 
court that would recognize mitigation so that, in appropriate 
cases, the child’s juvenile record can be expunged.  This would 
allow courts to address cases in which the child suffers from a 
mental illness that does not rise to the level of an insanity 
defense but is mitigating enough that it would violate the Eighth 
Amendment for the child to be found guilty of a felony that would 
remain on her record for the rest of her life.  Similarly, children 
living in environments that cause the child to be significantly 
more likely to engage in delinquent behavior would be eligible to 
have their juvenile records expunged.  This article proposes that, 
upon a plea or adjudication of delinquency at trial, the court 
should hear evidence on relevant mitigation.  If the judge finds 
that the child’s behavior was significantly impacted by factors 
beyond her control including, but not limited to, mental health 
issues, child abuse and socio-economic factors, the child will be 
able to have her juvenile record expunged upon completing 
appropriate treatment and demonstrating improved behavior.  
This would refocus a system that has become increasingly 
punitive on the purported rehabilitative nature of juvenile court 
and allow children from disadvantaged backgrounds to lead 
productive adult lives unconstrained by mistakes they made as 
teenagers. 
Youth prosecuted in juvenile court are not charged with 
crimes; rather, they are accused of having committed a 
delinquent act.3  While children are not charged with crimes, 
they are prosecuted under the same criminal statutes as adults.4  
 
3. In most states, the law provides that delinquent acts are not crimes.  
See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.35(6) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-606 
(West 2014); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 380.1 (McKinney 2007). 
4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.0301 (West 2015) (“(1) The circuit court 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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Therefore, defenses applicable to adults are the only defenses 
available to children.  Over time, the juvenile system has become 
increasingly punitive and less rehabilitative.5 
When a child suffers from a mental illness, raising an 
insanity defense is impractical for two distinct reasons.  First, 
insanity is notoriously difficult to prove, and, in the vast 
majority of cases would not provide a successful defense.  For 
example, Florida follows the well-known M’Naughton test for 
insanity.6  Under M’Naughton, an accused is not criminally 
 
has exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to 
have committed: (a) A delinquent act or violation of law.”). 
5. While every state has a juvenile court system today, the role of juvenile 
court has changed over time.  “At the dawn of the twentieth century, 
Progressive reformers applied the new theories of social control to the new 
ideas about childhood and created a social welfare alternative to criminal 
courts to treat criminal and noncriminal misconduct by youth.”   Barry C. Feld, 
The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 691 (1991).  
After several decades of reform, delinquency courts now closely resemble adult 
criminal courts.  Id.  Feld identifies three types of reform:  jurisdictional, 
jurisprudential and procedural.  Id. at 692.  Recent years have seen an 
increasing desire of society to criminalize the conduct of children.  As penalties 
have become more harsh and juvenile sanctions have become more like 
criminal sanctions, children do not receive the same protections adult criminal 
defendants do.  “Although theoretically, juvenile courts' procedural safeguards 
closely resemble those of criminal courts, in reality, the justice routinely 
afforded juveniles is lower than the minimum insisted upon for adults.”  Id.  
Feld argues: 
 
The substantive and procedural convergence between 
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the 
differences in strategies of social control between youths and 
adults.  As a result, no reason remains to maintain a separate 
juvenile court whose only distinction is its persisting 
procedural deficiencies.  Yet, even with the juvenile court's 
transformation from an informal, rehabilitative agency into 
a scaled-down criminal court, it continues to operate virtually 
unreformed.  The juvenile court's continued existence despite 
these changes reflects an ambivalence about children and 
their control, and provides an opportunity to re-examine 
basic assumptions about the nature and competence of young 
people. 
 
Id. at 692-93. 
6. See Gurganus v. Florida, 451 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1984). 
 
It is well established in Florida that the test for insanity, 
when used as a defense to a criminal charge is the 
McNaughton Rule.  Under McNaughton the only issues are: 
3
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responsible for his actions if, at the time of the offense, the 
defendant, by reason of a mental disease or defect, (1) does not 
know of the nature or consequences of his act; or (2) is unable to 
distinguish right from wrong.  Given the very high bar set by 
M’Naughton, a child could be suffering from a serious mental 
illness that significantly impacted her behavior and her ability 
to form the requisite intent but the diagnosis does not rise to the 
level of the insanity defense because the child meets the minimal 
standard of understanding right from wrong and understanding 
the consequences of her actions.7  As discussed in detail below, 
many at-risk children suffer from mental health issues or live in 
environments that contribute to negative behavior but neither 
of these factors can form the basis for an insanity defense if the 
child meets the M’Naughton standard.  Second, if a child is 
adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity, the child may be 
committed to a civil commitment facility indefinitely.8  Juvenile 
court jurisdiction ends at 19, but civil commitment may extend 
well beyond that.9  An adjudication of insanity will remain on 
the child’s record and could preclude her from obtaining jobs and 
professional licenses in the future.10 
 
1) the individual's ability at the time of the incident to 
distinguish right from wrong; and 2) his ability to understand 
the wrongness of the act committed. 
 
7. For example, in Gurganus, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court’s exclusion of expert testimony on insanity since the defense experts 
could not opine definitively that the defendant (an adult) lacked the ability to 
distinguish right from wrong.  Id.  The Court ruled that the trial court erred, 
however, when it excluded evidence that the defendant’s mental state along 
with his drug and alcohol consumption, negated his ability to form the specific 
intent required for a conviction of first-degree murder.  Id. 
8. See, e.g., FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.095(e) (West 2015).  Upon a finding of not 
guilty by reason of insanity, the juvenile court must hold a hearing to 
determine if the child meets the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment 
to a residential psychiatric facility.  See FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.095(e)(2) (West 
2015). 
9. If the child meets the criteria for hospitalization and is not released 
prior to her 19th birthday, a hearing must take place to determine if the child 
requires continued hospitalization.  See FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.095(e)(2)(G) (West 
2015).  If continued hospitalization is deemed necessary, proceedings must be 
instituted under the adult civil commitment statute.  Id.  Thus, a child 
adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity could remain committed to a 
residential psychiatric program well beyond the termination of jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court. 
10. See Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
  
562 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
Many children in juvenile court suffer from serious mental 
illnesses that do not present a defense under the current 
system.11  The only alternative to an insanity defense under 
current law is to argue that the child was unable to form the 
requisite intent due to her mental illness.12  However, most 
crimes are general intent crimes and the state must meet a very 
low burden to prove intent.13 
 
L. REV. 621, 632-33 (2005). 
 
Mental health defenses are, at least ostensibly, designed to 
protect those lacking sufficient mental responsibility from 
being undeservedly convicted and punished.  Yet the defenses 
carry consequences distinct from those accompanying other 
affirmative defenses.  Defendants acquitted on the basis of 
the “insanity defense” are typically committed for an 
indefinite period of time to a mental hospital, and may in fact 
spend more time institutionalized that they would if 
convicted of the offenses charged.  Furthermore, society 
attaches a stigma to mental health defenses that does not 
exist with other affirmative defenses; even after release, an 
acquitted defendant is subject to the social and economic 
opprobrium commonly associated with mental illness. 
 
11. See Joseph B. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to 
Identify, Accommodate, and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities 
Leads to Their Disproportionate Representation in the Delinquency System, 3 
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 3 (2003).  Tulman cites a statement made 
on the floor of the U.S. Senate by Senator Paul Wellstone: “Of the 100,000 
children who are arrested and incarcerated each year, as many as 50 percent 
suffer from a mental or emotional disturbance.”  Id. at 7. 
12. See, e.g., Gurganus, 451 So. 2d at 820. 
13. See Wayne R. LaFave, Intent and Knowledge, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIM. 
L. § 5.2(e) (1986) (footnotes omitted) 
 
[T]he most common usage of ‘specific intent’ is to designate a 
special mental element which is required above and beyond 
any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of 
the crime.  Common law larceny, for example, requires the 
taking and carrying away of the property of another, and the 
defendant's mental state as to this act must be established, 
but in addition it must be shown that there was an ‘intent to 
steal’ the property.  Similarly, common law burglary requires 
a breaking and entry into the dwelling of another, but in 
addition to the mental state connected with these acts it must 
also be established that the defendant acted ‘with intent to 
commit a felony therein.’  The same situation prevails with 
many statutory crimes: assault ‘with intent to kill’ as to 
certain aggravated assaults; confining another ‘for the 
5
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In many juvenile cases, abuse and mental illness are 
mitigating in the sense that they provide an explanation for the 
conduct rather than a legal excuse.14  “[A] substantial body of 
research has long supported the hypothesis that physical 
maltreatment, or abuse, leads to delinquency.  Victims of abuse 
have also been shown to engage in violent offending.”15  For 
example, the vast majority of girls in the juvenile justice system 
have been victims of abuse, including sexual abuse.16  This very 
 
purpose of ransom or reward’ in kidnapping; making an 
untrue statement ‘designedly, with intent to defraud’ in the 
crime of false pretenses; etc. 
 
14. See Jennifer Wareham & Denise Paquette Boots, The Link Between 
Mental Health Problems and Youth Violence in Adolescence, A Multilevel Test 
of DSM-Oriented Problems, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1003 (2012) (discussing 
the link between certain mental health diagnoses and delinquency); Linda A. 
Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1133 (2002) (study of juvenile detainees concluded that: 
 
Nearly two thirds of males and nearly three quarters of 
females met diagnostic criteria for one or more psychiatric 
disorders.  Excluding conduct disorder (common among 
detained youth), nearly 60% of males and more than two 
thirds of females met diagnostic criteria and had diagnosis-
specific impairment for one or more psychiatric disorders.  
Half of males and almost half of females had a substance use 
disorder, and more than 40% of males and females met 
criteria for disruptive behavior disorders.  Affective disorders 
were also prevalent, especially among females; more than 
20% of females met criteria for a major depressive episode.  
Rates of many disorders were higher among females, non-
Hispanic whites, and older adolescents.  These results 
suggest substantial psychiatric morbidity among juvenile 
detainees.  Youth with psychiatric disorders pose a challenge 
for the juvenile justice system and, after their release, for the 
larger mental health system. 
 
15. Wareham & Boots, supra note 14, at 1005 (citing Timothy Brezina, 
Adolescent Maltreatment and Delinquency: the Question of Intervening 
Processes, 35 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 71 (1998); Magda Stouthamer-Loeber et 
al., Maltreatment of Boys and the Development of Disruptive and Delinquent 
Behavior, 13 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 941 (2001)). 
16. See Unique Needs of Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, PHYSICIANS 
FOR HUM. RTS. 
http://www.women.ca.gov/portals/70/media/pdf/issues/women_girls_cjs/girls.p
df (last visited Oct. 21, 2015); (65% incarcerated girls experienced PTSD 
symptoms at some point in their lives); Leo Sher, Neurobiology of Suicidal 
Behavior in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 10 EXPERT REV. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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often leads to a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
other mental illnesses.17  A victim of sexual abuse is much more 
likely to react violently to a perceived threat than a child who 
does not suffer from PTSD.18 
Take the example of the delinquent act of battery on a school 
employee.  In many states, battery on a school employee is a 
felony.19  It is not uncommon for children at alternative schools 
who have behavior issues and mental health issues to have 
multiple charges under this statute.20  One child the author 
represented had five such charges.  On its face, this sounds like 
the fourteen year-old child routinely beat up his teachers.  A look 
at the facts proved otherwise.  One charge was based on the 
child’s touching a teacher’s chest with his fingers when the 
teacher looked over his shoulder while the child was on a school 
computer.  Another charge was based on the child lightly 
smacking a teacher’s arm when she tried to move him during a 
lineup.  Under applicable law, battery is considered a violent 
felony that can never be expunged.21  A juvenile adjudication of 
delinquency for battery on a teacher would, therefore, limit the 
child’s future access to student loans, preclude him from 
participating in college athletics, preclude him from many 
government jobs, preclude him from becoming a police officer or 
firefighter and possibly bar him from entering some branches of 
the military.22  Additionally, studies have shown that the earlier 
 
NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 1233 (2010) (48% were experiencing PTSD symptoms at 
time of study).  Depression, trauma, anger, self-destructive behavior or other 
mental health disorders were a factor for 79% of girls in residential programs 
and 84% of girls in non-residential programs.  Id. 
17. See Martin H. Teicher, Wounds that Time Won’t Heal: The 
Neurobiology of Child Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM: THE DANA FORUM ON BRAIN SCIENCE 
1, 3 (2000). 
17. See Martin H. Teicher, Wounds that Time Won’t Heal: The Neurobiology of 
Child Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM: THE DANA FORUM ON BRAIN SCIENCE 1, 3 (2000). 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.081(2)(c) (West 2014), FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 784.03 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13(d) (West 2015). 
20. See generally, Tulman, supra note 11. 
21. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0581 (West 2010). 
22. Under the guidelines of some athletic programs, if a child is arrested 
for any violent felony, possession of a weapon on school grounds, 
possession/sale of drugs on school grounds, or any other offense that can lead 
to expulsion from school, the child athlete may become ineligible to participate 
in the athletic program of the school including band and cheerleading.  (For 
further information, call NCAA Academic and Membership Affairs 317-917-
7
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a child enters the delinquency system, the more likely it is that 
she will acquire an extensive juvenile record.23 
The current proposal would allow the judge to adjudicate 
the child delinquent of the charged act, but still find that, due to 
significant mitigation, she should be allowed to have her record 
expunged upon fulfilling certain criteria.  This recognizes that 
the child could form the intent to commit the charged crime, but 
the response would be therapeutic rather than punitive.  If the 
child completes an appropriate treatment program, the charge 
would not remain on the child’s record into adulthood.  The child 
would also be required to perform other appropriate juvenile 
sanctions such as community service.  In this way, the child 
would learn to take responsibility for their actions, but the 
underlying trauma would be acknowledged in a way that allows 
the child to work towards a positive future. 
This proposal is consistent with the theories of the 
 
6008).  The Army has a “waiver” process of an applicant who has received a 
conviction or juvenile adjudication for a serious offense, but waivers for serious 
offenses are rarely granted; the Navy and Marines require an explanation for 
all juvenile cases even if the case was nolle prosse’d or non-filed, the Navy and 
Marines conduct a review to ensure that the dismissal was on the merits and 
not to facilitate enlistment into the Armed Forces.  The Air Force has a waiver 
process similar to that used by the Army but also looks at the surrounding 
circumstances and the applicant’s overall record.  Federal law, 24 C.F.R. § 
966.4 (2010) and some local rules state that no member of a family living in 
subsidized housing may engage in drug-related or violent criminal activity.  
The standard used in determining whether to evict is only preponderance of 
the evidence.  A genuine addiction can be a defense to an eviction proceeding.  
The Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A § 1091 (West 2014), provides that a 
person who is convicted of possession or sale of a controlled substance becomes 
ineligible to receive financial aid including work study for a set period of time 
depending on how many violations the child has.  Many states deny 
scholarships to students with a felony conviction.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
1009.531 (West 2014)  (Bright Futures and Medallion scholarships not 
available to a student who has been convicted of a felony and has not been 
granted clemency). 
23. See Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family 
Court: Balancing Intervention, Prevention and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L. Q. 381, 
386 (2003) (“[T]hose who began offending as young children were more likely 
to become violent offenders. . . . [T]he earlier a youth entered the juvenile 
justice system, the more likely he or she was to acquire an extensive juvenile 
court record.”) (citing Howard N. Snyder., Epidemiology of Official Offending, 
in CHILD DELINQUENTS: DEVELOPMENT, INTERVENTION, AND SERVICE NEEDS, 25 
(Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2001) and Howard N. Snyder et al., 
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Therapeutic Jurisprudence/preventive law model that focuses 
on rehabilitation rather than punishment.  The theory of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence is to “broaden the counseling 
mission, and . . . convert the practice of law into a helping and 
healing profession in ways that may make it a much more 
humanitarian tool.”24 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence is inconsistent with current law 
and procedure in juvenile court.  Because the collateral 
consequences of a felony conviction are lifelong,25 children are 
advised to invoke their right to remain silent and have almost 
no role in the process.  This proposal would allow the child to 
testify to the circumstances of her life and how it impacted her 
behavior without subjecting her to the equivalent of adult 
criminal consequences. 
Originally, the goal of juvenile court was rehabilitation.  
That changed drastically over time,26 and now, the relevant 
 
24. Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 15, 50 (1997). 
25. See supra note 22. 
26. See Tulman, supra note 11, at 3.  Tulman cites a statement made on 
the floor of the U.S. Senate by Senator Paul Wellstone: “Of the 100,000 children 
who are arrested and incarcerated each year, as many as 50 percent suffer 
from a mental or emotional disturbance.”  Id. at 7.  Tulman summarizes the 
situation concerning children with education-related disabilities in the 
delinquency system very powerfully. 
 
The substantive and procedural convergence between 
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the 
differences in strategies of social control between youths and 
adults.  As a result, no reason remains to maintain a separate 
juvenile court whose only distinction is its persisting 
procedural deficiencies.  Yet, even with the juvenile court's 
transformation from an informal, rehabilitative agency into 
a scaled-down criminal court, it continues to operate virtually 
unreformed. The juvenile court's continued existence despite 
these changes reflects an ambivalence about children and 
their control, and provides an opportunity to re-examine 
basic assumptions about the nature and competence of young 
people. 
 
Feld, supra note 5, at 692-93.  It is also well-documented that poor and 
minority children are substantially over-represented in the delinquency 
population.  See Heidi M. Hsia et al., Disproportionate Minority Confinement, 
2002 Update, U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. 
PREVENTION 1 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/201240.pdf 
9
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Florida Statute provides that the purpose of the delinquency 
system is to first “protect the public” from acts of delinquency.27  
This article will argue that the punitive model has failed and 
that it is time to allow a procedure that recognizes the unique 
issues faced by juveniles with mental health issues, especially 
when those issues are the result of abuse. 
The Supreme Court has recognized in a recent series of 
cases that the brains of even normal children function entirely 
differently than those of “normal” adults.28  This article will 
 
((“Although minority youth account for about one-third of the U.S. juvenile 
population, they comprise two-thirds of the juvenile detention/corrections 
population.”); see also Carl E. Pope et al., Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement, A Review of the Research Literature from 1989 through 2001, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST., OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS,  OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, JUV. 
JUST. BULL. 1 (2006), http://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/pdf/dmc89_01.pdf.  For 
excellent information about the realities of life for poor children, see NAT’L CTR. 
FOR CHILD. IN POVERTY, www.nccp.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
27. FLA. STAT. ANN § 985.03(12) (West 2014). 
28. The United States Supreme Court has decided three landmark cases 
recently that recognize the fundamental principle that children are different.  
See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding that a child’s age 
must be taken into account in determining whether a child was in custody for 
purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010) (abolishing life without parole for children convicted of crimes 
other than homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (abolishing the 
juvenile death penalty).  Each of these cases relied to a large extent on 
developing science demonstrating that children’s brains function in a 
fundamentally different way than do the brains of adults. 
 
The substantive and procedural convergence between 
juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the 
differences in strategies of social control between youths and 
adults.  As a result, no reason remains to maintain a separate 
juvenile court whose only distinction is its persisting 
procedural deficiencies.  Yet, even with the juvenile court's 
transformation from an informal, rehabilitative agency into 
a scaled-down criminal court, it continues to operate virtually 
unreformed.  The juvenile court's continued existence despite 
these changes reflects an ambivalence about children and 
their control, and provides an opportunity to re-examine 
basic assumptions about the nature and competence of young 
people. 
 
Feld, supra note 5, at 692-93.  An amicus brief relied upon by the Graham court 
explains succinctly how children’s brains are different: 
 
Research in developmental psychology and neuroscience—
including the research presented to the Court in Simmons 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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argue that the lifelong consequences of a felony are 
disproportionate to the conduct of children who suffer from 
mental illness or live in extreme socio-economic deprivation so 
that the proposed procedure is required under the Eighth 
Amendment.  In addition, due process is violated when a child is 
forced to choose between raising an insanity defense at trial, or 
taking a plea to a felony, both of which have lifelong negative 
consequences. 
Recent Supreme Court cases have recognized the science 
underlying the common-sense notion that children are not “little 
adults.”  Their brains function in a completely different manner 
than those of adults.  In 2005, the Court abolished the juvenile 
death penalty and recognized the neuroscience underlying the 
 
and additional research conducted since Simmons was 
decided—confirms and strengthens the conclusion that 
juveniles, as a group, differ from adults in the salient ways 
the Court identified.  Juveniles—including older 
adolescents—are less able to restrain their impulses and 
exercise self-control; less capable than adults of considering 
alternative courses of action and maturely weighing risks 
and rewards; and less oriented to the future and thus less 
capable of apprehending the consequences of their often-
impulsive actions.  For all those reasons, even once their 
general cognitive abilities approximate those of adults, 
juveniles are less capable than adults of mature judgment, 
and more likely to engage in risky, even criminal, behavior 
as a result of that immaturity.  Research also demonstrates 
that ‘juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,’ 
while at the same time they lack the freedom and autonomy 
that adults possess to escape such pressures.  Finally, 
because juveniles are still in the process of forming a coherent 
identity, adolescent crime often reflects the ‘signature’—and 
transient—‘qualities of youth’ itself, rather than an 
entrenched bad character.  Research has documented that 
the vast majority of youthful offenders will desist from 
criminal behavior in adulthood. And the malleability of 
adolescence means that there is no reliable way to identify 
the minority who will not. 
 
Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental Health 
America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48 (2009) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2236778, at *3-4 (citations 
omitted); Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.  As the science of juvenile brain development 
has advanced considerably, there have not been any corresponding major 
changes in delinquency court. 
11
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claim that those under the age of eighteen should not be subject 
to the ultimate punishment due to the fundamental immaturity 
of their brains.29  Later cases, discussed in depth below, followed 
similar reasoning in abolishing life without parole for non-
homicides for juvenile offenders30 and in holding that juvenile 
offenders cannot be subjected to a mandatory life sentence even 
for homicide.31 
Delinquency proceedings are proceedings in juvenile court 
in which children are charged with “delinquent acts”—the 
juvenile equivalent of an adult crime.  In most states, the law 
provides that delinquent acts are not crimes.32  While every state 
has a juvenile court system today, the role of juvenile court has 
changed over time; “[a]t the dawn of the twentieth century, 
Progressive reformers applied the new theories of social control 
to the new ideas about childhood and created a social welfare 
alternative to criminal courts to treat criminal and noncriminal 
misconduct by youth.”33  After several decades of reform, 
delinquency courts now closely resemble adult criminal courts.34  
Barry Feld has identified three types of reform affecting the 
juvenile court system: jurisdictional, jurisprudential, and 
procedural.35  Recent years have seen an increase in society’s 
desire to criminalize the conduct of children.  While penalties 
have become harsher and juvenile sanctions have become more 
like criminal sanctions, juvenile courts are not required to 
provide children with the same protections afforded to adult 
defendants.  According to Feld, “[a]lthough theoretically, 
juvenile courts’ procedural safeguards closely resemble those of 
criminal courts, in reality, the justice routinely afforded 
juveniles is lower than the minimum insisted upon for adults.”36  
Feld argues: 
 
The substantive and procedural convergence 
 
29. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551, 573-74, 578. 
30. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48, 68-69, 80. 
31. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012). 
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.35(6) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
11-606 (West 2014); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 380.1 (McKinney 2007). 
33. Feld, supra note 5, at 691. 
34. Id. 
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between juvenile and criminal courts eliminates 
virtually all of the differences in strategies of 
social control between youths and adults. As a 
result, no reason remains to maintain a separate 
juvenile court whose only distinction is its 
persisting procedural deficiencies. Yet, even with 
the juvenile court’s transformation from an 
informal, rehabilitative agency into a scaled-down 
criminal court, it continues to operate virtually 
unreformed. The juvenile court’s continued 
existence despite these changes reflects an 
ambivalence about children and their control, and 
provides an opportunity to re-examine basic 
assumptions about the nature and competence of 
young people.37 
 
Historically, youth in delinquency court were not afforded 
all of the protections given to adults facing criminal charges.38  
This was because juvenile court was seen as a way for the state 
to step in where children were engaging in socially unacceptable 
behavior, often due to lack of supervision at home.39  Some have 
noted a distinct class element to early juvenile courts, arguing 
that such courts were a way for society to exercise control over 
 
37. Id. at 692-93. 
38. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). 
 
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and 
penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long 
prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals.  
They were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the 
child could not be confined by the concept of justice alone.  
They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether 
the child was ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’ but ‘What is he, how has 
he become what he is, and what had best be done in his 
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a 
downward career.'  The child—essentially good, as they saw 
it—was to be made ‘to feel that he is the object of (the state's) 
care and solicitude,’ not that he was under arrest or on trial.  
The rules of criminal procedure were therefore altogether 
inapplicable. 
 
39. William W. Booth, History and Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, FL. 
JUV. L. & PRAC. § 1.6 (2013). 
13
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“lower-class” youth.40  A report submitted by the Cook County 
(Illinois) Bar Association to the Illinois state legislature in 
support of the creation of the first juvenile court stated that: 
 
The fundamental idea of the Juvenile Court Law 
is that the State must step in and exercise 
guardianship over a child found under such 
adverse social or individual conditions as develop 
crime. . . . It proposes a plan whereby he may be 
treated, not as a criminal, or legally charged with 
a crime, but as a ward of the state.41 
 
Over time, however, the courts, including the United States 
Supreme Court, began to recognize that the ideal of kindly 
juvenile judges who used their wide discretion to help at-risk 
children was far from the reality faced every day by children in 
delinquency court.42  In the seminal case of In re Gault, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
 
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated 
that unbridled discretion, however benevolently 
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for 
principle and procedure. In 1937, Dean Pound 




Early juvenile law generally grew from citizen concern for 
children who, lacking parental control, discipline, and 
supervision, were coming before the criminal court for 
truancy, begging, homelessness, and petty criminal activity.  
There were distinct social phenomena that contributed to 
these problems, including a large population of children from 
broken families in the aftermath of the Civil War, latchkey 
children of parents who were unable to provide supervision 
during long work hours, lack of child care, and lack of free or 
compulsory education for children. 
 
41. Id. at § 1.2. 
42. In Gault, the Court traced the historical development of juvenile 
delinquency court and demonstrated that, as the consequences of a juvenile 
adjudication of delinquency became more severe, procedures similar to those 
used in adult criminal court were required by the Due Process Clause.  In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. at 13-18. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
  
572 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:2 
trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile 
courts . . . . The absence of substantive standards 
has not necessarily meant that children receive 
careful, compassionate, individualized treatment. 
The absence of procedural rules based upon 
constitutional principle has not always produced 
fair, efficient, and effective procedures. 
Departures from established principles of due 
process have frequently resulted not in 
enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.43 
 
The facts of Gault demonstrate just how dangerous giving 
any judge unbridled discretion can be.  One afternoon in 1964, a 
fifteen-year-old named Gerald Francis Gault and a friend 
purportedly made a prank phone call.44  As eloquently described 
by Justice Fortas, the calls “were of the irritatingly offensive, 
adolescent, sex variety.”45  At the time of the “offense,” Gerald 
was on probation because he had been caught in the company of 
another teenager who stole a wallet.46  Gerald was taken into 
custody while both of his parents were at work.47  No notice was 
left for the parents, and no attempt was made to contact them to 
let them know that their son was in custody.48  Upon learning of 
her son’s whereabouts from a neighbor, Gerald’s mother went to 
the detention home, where Gerald’s probation officer told her of 
her son’s alleged acts and informed her that there would be a 
hearing the next day.49  The probation officer filed a petition in 
juvenile court that Gerald’s parents did not see until a federal 
habeas proceeding was brought.50  The petition did not allege 
any factual basis for the court proceeding.51  At the “hearing” the 
next day, the complainant was not present, and no transcript or 
written memorandum of the proceedings was created.52  Gerald 
 
43. Id. at 18-19. 
44. Id. at 4. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
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was questioned by the judge but was not told that he had a right 
to remain silent.53  A few days later, without explanation, Gerald 
was released.54  Shortly thereafter, his parents were notified 
simply that there would be another hearing.55  Once again, the 
complainant was not present, and Gerald testified without 
having been advised of his constitutional rights.56  Gerald’s 
mother specifically requested the presence of the complainant so 
that she could identify which of the two boys had actually made 
the lewd remarks.57  At the hearing, a referral report was sent 
to the court by the probation officers, but was not sent to Gerald 
or his parents.58  At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge 
committed Gerald to the State Industrial School as a juvenile 
delinquent until his twenty-first birthday, “unless sooner 
discharged by due process of law.”59  At no point were Gerald or 
his parents advised that he had a right to counsel.60  In essence, 
Gerald was sentenced to six years in juvenile prison for a prank 
phone call without any notice of the charges, without having 
been able to cross-examine the complainant, without knowledge 
that he could remain silent, and without the advice of counsel. 
In Gault, the Court reevaluated the juvenile justice system 
and held that many of the fundamental protections afforded to 
criminal defendants must be afforded to children facing charges 
in delinquency court.  The Court noted the severe consequences 
of a juvenile adjudication of delinquency, and stated that “it 
would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the 
procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the 
phrase ‘due process.’ Under our Constitution, the condition of 
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”61 
The Court held that due process requires that children be 
given notice of the charges against them,62 that the Sixth and 
 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 6. 




59. Id. at 7-8. 
60. Id. at 10. 
61. Id. at 27-28. 
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Fourteenth Amendments require that children be advised of 
their right to counsel, that they be provided with counsel if they 
cannot afford counsel,63 that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments require that children be able to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against them, and that children may 
invoke the right against self-incrimination.64  The Court 
specifically rejected the argument that this right should not 
apply to children because confession is therapeutic.65  A few 
 
Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have 
described—that is, notice which would be deemed 
constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding. It 
does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth’s freedom 
and his parents’ right to his custody are at stake without 
giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the 
specific issues that they must meet. 
 
Id. at 33-34. 
63. Id. at 36. 
 
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with 
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to 
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain 
whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.  The 
child ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in 
the proceedings against him. 
 
 (footnote omitted) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932)). 
64. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42-57.  (“It would indeed be surprising if the 
privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but 
not to children.”).  Id. at 47.  While the Court declined to rule on the child’s 
argument that the Constitution requires appellate review of juvenile 
delinquency proceedings and the right to a transcript of such proceedings, most 
states provide for transcription of delinquency proceedings and appellate 
review of these proceedings.  See, e.g., FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.830 (West 2015) 
(providing for written transcripts of all proceedings in delinquency court); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 985.534 (West 2007) (providing a right to appeal from an 
adjudication of delinquency). 
65. Gault, 387 U.S. at 51. 
 
It is also urged . . . that the juvenile and presumably his 
parents should not be advised of the juvenile’s right to silence 
because confession is good for the child as the commencement 
of the assumed therapy of the juvenile court process, and he 
should be encouraged to assume an attitude of trust and 
confidence toward the officials of the juvenile process. This 
proposition has been subjected to widespread challenge on 
the basis of current reappraisals of the rhetoric and realities 
of the handling of juvenile offenders. In fact, evidence is 
accumulating that confessions by juveniles do not aid in 
17
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years later, the Court held that every element of the offense 
charged in a petition for delinquency must be proven to the trier 
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.66  However, a year later, the 
Court held that children are not entitled to a jury in delinquency 
proceedings.67  In most states, a juvenile judge presides over all 
pretrial proceedings and the adjudicatory hearing.68 
The Court’s rationale in holding that children are not 
entitled to a jury in delinquency proceedings was based upon the 
notion that juvenile proceedings are supposed to be 
rehabilitative rather than punitive.  The standard of due process 
required in juvenile delinquency proceedings, as developed in 
Gault and Winship, is “fundamental fairness.”69  Despite 
acknowledging the many flaws in the juvenile system as it 
existed at the time—and acknowledging that the juvenile 
system could impose the functional equivalent of prison on 
children—the Court held that a jury is not required in a 
delinquency proceeding. The Court explained: 
 
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary 
and other rules of evidence, about the juvenile 
 
‘individualized treatment,’ as the court below put it, and that 
compelling the child to answer questions, without warning or 
advice as to his right to remain silent, does not serve this or 
any other good purpose. . . . it seems probable that where 
children are induced to confess by ‘paternal’ urgings on the 
part of officials and the confession is then followed by 
disciplinary action, the child’s reaction is likely to be hostile 
and adverse—the child may well feel that he has been led or 
tricked into confession and that despite his confession, he is 
being punished. 
 
Id. at 51-52. 
66. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364-69 (1970) (noting that “the Due 
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.”  Id. at 364, and that such a right is applicable to children 
“during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding[.]” Id. at 368). 
67. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1971) (holding 
that a jury is not constitutionally required in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings). 
68. See, e.g., FLA. R. JUV. PROC. 8.110(c) (West 2015) (“The adjudicatory 
hearing shall be conducted by the judge without a jury. At this hearing the 
court determines whether the allegations of the petition have been 
sustained.”). 
69. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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court judge’s possible awareness of the juvenile’s 
prior record and of the contents of the social file; 
about repeated appearances of the same familiar 
witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation 
officers and social workers—all to the effect that 
this will create the likelihood of pre-judgment—
chooses to ignore it seems to us, every aspect of 
fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal 
attention that the juvenile court system 
contemplates.70 
 
While the primary purpose of juvenile court may at one 
point have been rehabilitation,71 that is no longer the case today.  
The legislative intent for the juvenile justice system in most 
states72 is to protect the public from acts of delinquency.73  
Preventing delinquency, strengthening the family, early 
intervention, and rehabilitation are often listed as secondary 
goals of the juvenile justice system.74  It appears that Justice 
Fortas’ warning in Kent over forty years ago is more applicable 
today than ever: “[T]here may be grounds for concern that the 
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the 
 
70. Id. at 550. 
71. See generally Feld, supra note 5. 
72. A few states, however, still prioritize the rehabilitation and care of the 
child.  See, e.g., LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 801 (1992) (providing that each child 
facing delinquency proceedings receive the “care, guidance and control that 
will be conducive to his welfare . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-402 (1994) 
(providing for “individualized accountability and individualized treatment . . . 
.” in the delinquency system). 
73. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-102 (West 1997) (“[T]he intent 
of this article is to protect, restore, and improve the public safety by creating a 
system of juvenile justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate 
the law and, in certain cases, will also provide the opportunity to bring together 
affected victims, the community, and juvenile offenders for restorative 
purposes.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.02(3) (West 1997) (stating that legislative 
intent of the juvenile justice system is “to first protect the public from acts of 
delinquency.”);  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 3085c(c)(1)(A) (2013) (stating that a 
juvenile justice system should “[h]old juveniles accountable for their unlawful 
conduct.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.01(2) (West 2009) (“It is the intent of the 
legislature to promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the 
problem of juvenile delinquency, a system which will protect the community, 
impose accountability for violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with 
competencies to live responsibly and productively.”). 
74. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 985.02(3)(a)-(d) (West 2014). 
19
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protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and 
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”75 
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has 
recently decided several landmark cases recognizing the 
fundamental principle that children are different from adults.76  
Each of these cases relied to a large extent on developing science 
demonstrating that children’s brains function in a 
fundamentally different manner than those of adults.  As the 
Roper Court noted, teenagers are generally less mature, more 
prone to reckless behavior, and much more susceptible to 
negative influences than adults; the possibility of rehabilitation 
is also greater for teenagers than for adults.77  An amicus brief 
relied upon by the Graham court explains succinctly how 
children’s brains are different. For example, even older 
adolescents “are less able to restrain their impulses and exercise 
self-control; less capable than adults of considering alternative 
courses of action and maturely weighing risks and rewards; and 
less oriented to the future and thus less capable of apprehending 
the consequences of their often-impulsive actions.”78  Teenagers 
are much more likely to be influenced by negative peers and, 
because they are not adults, lack the autonomy to escape such 
influences even if they desire to do so.79  Because a significant 
amount of juvenile criminal behavior is attributable to the 
transient characteristics of youth, research has shown that the 
vast majority of youthful offenders do not continue to engage in 
criminal behavior as adults.80  Yet as the science of juvenile 
 
75. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
76. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011) (holding 
that a child’s age must be taken into account in determining whether a child 
was in custody when "the child's age was known . . .  or would have been 
objectively apparent to a reasonable officer” for purposes of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) 
(abolishing life without parole for children convicted of crimes other than 
homicide); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2004) (abolishing the juvenile 
death penalty). 
77. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70. 
78. Brief for the American Psychological Association, American 
Psychiatric Association, National Association of Social Workers, and Mental 
Health America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3-4, Graham v. 
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brain development has advanced considerably, there have not 
been any corresponding major changes in the way cases are 
transferred from delinquency court to adult criminal court. 
The Court has long recognized that cognitive functioning is 
relevant to an Eighth Amendment analysis of a particular 
punishment.81  In the context of the death penalty, the Court 
specifically recognized that youth is a mitigating factor that 
must be considered by the sentencing jury.82  In 1982, prior to 
the recent progress in developmental neuroscience, the Supreme 
Court recognized the fundamental, commonsense fact that 
children are different than adults.83  The Court stated that “the 
chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor 
of great weight, so must the background and mental and 
emotional development of a youthful defendant be duly 
considered in sentencing.”84 
Further, in 2002, the Court expressly recognized the link 
between cognitive functioning and criminal culpability.85  In 
holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of the 
mentally retarded, the Court held that “[b]ecause of their 
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their 
impulses, [mentally retarded offenders] do not act with the level 
of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult 
criminal conduct.”86  This holding provided the basis for the 
Court’s decision in Roper, which banned the juvenile death 
penalty.87  In Roper, the Court recognized that developmental 
neuroscience has demonstrated that the brains of teenagers are 
fundamentally different from those of adults in ways that 
 
81. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment requires a capital sentencing jury to be allowed to consider 
“any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances 
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1976) (holding that, in order 
to comply with the Eighth Amendment, the jury must consider any mitigating 
circumstances).  While Lockett and Gregg were capital cases, their recognition 
that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of any relevant mitigating 
factors is applicable to the analysis that follows. 
82. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982). 
83. Id. at 115-16. 
84. Id. at 116. 
85. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment bars the execution of the mentally retarded). 
86. Id. at 306. 
87. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
21
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directly affect culpability,88 noting that “[t]he susceptibility of 
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their 
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of 
an adult.’”89  Indeed, “[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating 
factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth 
are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and 
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”90  
In Graham, the Court, relying on Roper, recognized that “[t]hese 
salient characteristics mean that ‘[i]t is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and 
the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable 
corruption.’”91 
In Roper, the Court relied on several scientific studies 
analyzing juvenile brain development.92  Several professional 
associations wrote and submitted an amicus brief to the Roper 
court.93  The amicus brief in Roper detailed the ways in which 
the brains of youth differ in structure and functioning from those 
of adults.94  The authors explained that the regions of the brain 
associated with impulse control, regulation of emotions, risk 
assessment, and moral reasoning are among the last to develop, 
and often are not fully developed until the early to mid-
twenties.95  The authors also found that “[p]sychosocial maturity 
 
88. Id. at 570 (noting that the personality traits of children are less formed 
than those of adults). 
89. Id. (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality 
opinion)). 
90. Id. (citation omitted). 
91. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 573 (2004)). 
92. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, 
Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)). 
93. Brief of the American Medical Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy 
of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Psychiatry and the 
Law, National Association of Social Workers, Missouri Chapter of the National 
Association of Social Workers, and National Mental Health Association as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549, at *1 [hereinafter Roper Brief]. 
94. See id. 
95. Id. at *4 (noting that the tests that formed the basis of its conclusions 
were performed on healthy adolescents and that those in the criminal justice 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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is incomplete until age 19.”96  In a finding of particular relevance 
to youth involved in the juvenile justice system, the authors cited 
studies showing that “the deficiencies in the adolescent mind 
and emotional and social development are especially pronounced 
when other factors—such as stress, emotions, and peer 
pressure—enter the equation.  These factors . . . operate on the 
adolescent mind differently and with special force.”97 
Further, scientists confirm that “[a]dolescents’ behavioral 
immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their 
brains.”98  Studies have shown that adolescents rely more than 
adults on the amygdala, the area of the brain associated with 
the primitive impulses of anger, aggression, and fear.99  In 
contrast, adults tend to process similar information through the 
frontal cortex, a cerebral area associated with impulse control 
and good judgment.100  The frontal and pre-frontal cortex, critical 
areas of the brain that control impulse, judgment, risk-taking, 
and weighing consequences, are among the last to develop and, 
often, are not fully developed until the mid-twenties.101 
The picture below contains MRI images that demonstrate 
the structural changes that take place in the brain from ages five 
to twenty.102  Researchers at the National Institutes of Health, 
the National Institute of Mental Health, and the University of 
 
system often “suffer from serious psychological disturbances that substantially 
exacerbate the already existing vulnerabilities of youth, [such that] they can 
be expected to function at sub-standard levels”). 
96. Id. at *7 (“Adolescents ‘score lower on measures of self-reliance and 
other aspects of personal responsibility, they have more difficulty seeing things 
in long-term perspective, they are less likely to look at things from the 
perspective of others, and they have more difficulty restraining their 
aggressive impulses.’”). 
97. Id. at *7-8.  “Stress affects cognitive abilities, including the ability to 
weigh costs and benefits and to override impulses with rational thought.  But 
adolescents are more susceptible to stress from daily events than adults, which 
translates into further distortion of the already skewed cost-benefit analysis.”  
Id. at *8. 
98. Id. at *11. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at *6-8. 
102. Paul Thompson, The Adolescent Brain—Why Teenagers Think and 
Act Differently, EDINFORMATICS 
http://www.edinformatics.com/news/teenage_brains.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 
2015) (depicting MRI images taken from time-lapse imaging tracking brain 
maturation from ages five to twenty). 
23
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California at Los Angeles conducted a decade-long study using 
magnetic resonance imaging to track the development of the 
brain.103 The study concluded that “‘higher-order’ brain centers, 
such as the prefrontal cortex, don’t fully develop until young 
adulthood as grey matter104 wanes in a back-to-front wave as the 
brain matures and neural connections are pruned.”105  In the 
MRI scans below, red indicates more grey matter and blue 
indicates less grey matter.106  As any adult can attest, teenagers 
lack the “brakes” that keep them from engaging in impulsive and 
reckless activities.107  The “brakes” are located in the frontal 
lobe—the last part of the brain to develop.108  Many other 






104. Roper Brief, supra note 93, at *18-20.  One of the last parts of the 
brain to mature is the pre-frontal cortex.  Id. at 16.  This process is known as 
“pruning”; pruning of gray matter improves the functioning of the brain’s 
reasoning centers by establishing some pathways while extinguishing others, 
thereby enhancing brain functioning.  Id. at *18. 




109. See Roper Brief, supra note 93, at *15-17. 
 
[T]he limbic system is more active in adolescent brains than 
adult brains, particularly in the region of the amygdala and 
that the frontal lobes of the adolescent brain are less active. . 
. . [A]s teenagers grow into adults, they increasingly shift the 
overall focus of brain activity to the frontal lobes. . . . [T]he 
brain’s frontal lobes are still structurally immature well into 
late adolescence.  The prefrontal cortex (which [is] associated 
with impulse control, risk assessment, and moral reasoning) 
is ‘one of the last brain regions to mature.’ . . . [Additionally,] 
[m]yelination is the process by which the brain’s axons are 
coated with a fatty white substance called myelin. . . . ‘The 
presence of myelin makes communication between different 
parts of the brain faster and more reliable.  Myelination . . . 
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As noted above, these conclusions were drawn from studies 
performed on the brains of normal adolescents. Many of the 
youth facing charges in delinquency court are at-risk youth who 
are either in foster care or unstable, often violent homes110; if 
 
110. See Tulman, supra note 11, at 7 (“Of the 100,000 children who are 
arrested and incarcerated each year, as many as 50 percent suffer from a 
mental or emotional disturbance.”).  Tulman powerfully summarizes the 
situation concerning children with education-related disabilities in the 
delinquency system, noting that: 
 
Poor educational performance among children in the delinquency 
system is, in significant part, a function of the high percentage of 
children in that system who have education-related disabilities 
and who, more particularly, have not received the benefit of 
appropriate, and effective special education services.  Indeed, the 
majority of children in the juvenile delinquency system are 
children with education-related disabilities.  The delinquency 
system disproportionately attracts children with education-
related disabilities both because those children are more likely to 
engage in delinquent conduct than their non-disabled peers and 
because the adults responsible for educational and delinquency 
systems are more likely to label and treat children with 
education-related disabilities as delinquent. 
 
Poor educational outcomes that are pervasive among children in 
the delinquency system constitute, in several respects, compelling 
evidence that school system and delinquency system personnel 
are failing to deliver appropriate educational services and failing 
to accommodate children with disabilities. The outcomes also, 
however, often reflect failure by school system and delinquency 
system personnel even to recognize education-related disabilities.  
These outcomes suggest, furthermore, that decision-makers 
guarding the gates to the delinquency system generally, and to 
incarceration facilities particularly, treat children with 
25
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they attend school at all, they attend alternative schools.111.  It 
is also well documented that poor and minority children are 
substantially over-represented in the delinquency population.112 
In criminal law, the law not only punishes the alleged act, 
but also the state of mind, or intent, of the defendant. For 
example, in Florida, a premeditated murder committed in the 
course of certain enumerated felonies is a capital crime.113  By 
contrast, a homicide that occurs during one of the enumerated 
 
education-related disabilities differently than children who are 
not disabled. In vastly disproportionate numbers, children who 
are poor and who are members of racial and ethnic minority 
groups populate the delinquency system.  The disproportionate 
numbers, moreover, reflect the harsh reality that society imposes 
unequal and discriminatory treatment upon poor children of 
color.  Researchers and journalists have documented the 
disproportionate representation and disparate, discriminatory 
treatment of children based upon race and class.  In contrast, 
disproportionate representation and disparate, discriminatory 
treatment within the delinquency system of children with 
disabilities has not been sufficiently studied and documented.  
Estimates of the correlation between delinquency and disabilities 
vary widely. 
 
Id. at 4-5. 
111. The term “alternative school” is used to describe schools where 
students are transferred for disciplinary reasons or because they have been 
suspended or expelled from mainstream schools.  See Maureen Carroll, 
Racialized Assumptions and Constitutional Harm: Claims of Injury Based on 
Public School Assignment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 903, 905-06 (2011). 
  
In a typical disciplinary transfer case, the student has been 
involuntary transferred from a mainstream school to an 
alternative program without the procedural safeguards that 
accompany formal expulsions. Many alternative schools used 
for this purpose have limited classroom instruction, strict 
disciplinary procedures, and no extracurricular activities.  
Often, the only students attending an alternative school are 
those placed involuntarily for disciplinary or remedial 
reasons.  Students attending disciplinary programs face a 
dramatically higher risk of violence than those attending 
mainstream schools.  Moreover, because of curricular 
differences, students returning to a mainstream school from 
an alternative program may be unable to advance to the next 
grade or to graduate with their peers. 
Id. 
112. See Hsia et al., supra note 26; see also Carl E. Pope et al., supra note 
26. 
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West 2015). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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felonies without any design to effect death is a second-degree 
felony with a maximum fifteen-year sentence.114  There is no 
requirement in the law that courts evaluate a child’s ability to 
form criminal intent before the child is transferred to adult 
court. 
Many children facing charges in delinquency court are also 
in dependency proceedings, meaning that they have been 
abused, abandoned, or neglected by their parent(s).115  Many 
other juvenile defendants have been victims of serious—often 
violent—physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.116  This type of 
abuse has a direct impact on the functioning of the areas of the 
brain that control impulsive, risky, and unlawful behavior.117 
Even before recent advances in neuroscience, psychologists 
recognized that adolescents do not form intent in the same 
manner as adults. As Dr. Marty Beyer, a leading expert in the 
area, explained: “[f]rom a psychological perspective, intention in 
children is a complex area, particularly considering their limited 
capacity to think ahead to the unforeseen long-term 
consequences of their immediate action.”118  Critically, Dr. Beyer 
concluded “that from the standpoint of cognitive development, 
young people have diminished capacity to intend harm to others 
or anticipate harm as an unintended consequence of their 
actions.”119  Teenagers often demonstrate a disconnect between 
their actions and the resulting consequence.120  Many teenagers 
see their behavior as the only option in a certain situation, but 
fail to recognize their responsibility for putting themselves in 
the situation in the first place.121  This “adolescent disconnect 
between one action and another goes to the heart of culpability 
 
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(6)(d) (West 2014). 
115. See generally Denise C. Herz et al., Challenges Facing Crossover 
Youth: An Examination of Juvenile-Justice Decision Making and Recidivism, 
48 FAM. CT. REV. 305 (2010). 
116. Id. 
117. See Understanding the Effects of Maltreatment on Brain 
Development, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY (2009), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/brain_development.pdf. 
118. Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD. 
RTS. J. 16, 18 (1999) (“Carrying a weapon and even using a weapon does not 
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and results from an immature thought process (not anticipating 
unintended consequences; reacting to threat) and incomplete 
moral development . . . .”122 
Abuse, trauma, and neglect further impact a young person’s 
ability to form intent, as these factors can significantly alter 
brain development.123  This abuse includes emotional abuse.124  
After conducting extensive research, Dr. Martin Teicher 
concluded that “early maltreatment, even exclusively 
psychological abuse, has enduring negative effects on brain 
development.”125  In an observation particularly relevant to the 
appropriate punishment for young offenders, Dr. Teicher 
explained: 
Physical, sexual, and psychological trauma in 
childhood may lead to psychiatric difficulties that 
show up in childhood, adolescence, or adulthood. 
The victim’s anger, shame, and despair can be 
directed inward to spawn symptoms such as 
depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and post-
traumatic stress, or directed outward as 
aggression, impulsiveness, delinquency, 
hyperactivity, and substance abuse.126 
Some of the disorders strongly associated with child abuse 
are those that may cause unlawful behavior, such as borderline 
personality disorder or dissociative identity disorder.127  
Similarly, victims of child abuse may suffer from post-traumatic 
stress disorder (“PTSD”), the symptoms of which include 
“irritability or outbursts of anger” and “an exaggerated startle 
response.”128  Dr. Teicher argues that “the trauma of abuse 
induces a cascade of effects, including changes in hormones and 
neurotransmitters that mediate development of vulnerable 
brain regions.”129  Dr. Teicher and other scientists have 
 
122. Id. at 18-19. 
123. See Teicher, supra note 17. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1. 
126. Id. at 2. 
127. Id. at 3. 
128. Id. at 3. 
129. Id. at 4. 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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identified “a constellation of brain abnormalities associated with 
child abuse,” including limbic irritability,130 deficient 
development, differentiation of the left hemisphere,131 deficient 
left-right hemisphere interaction,132 and abnormal activity in 
the cerebellar vermis (the middle strip between the two 
hemispheres of the brain).133  Of particular relevance here are 
the effects of abuse on the development of the hippocampus, 
which is involved in regulating memory and emotion.134  Dr. 
Teicher’s findings demonstrate that child abuse has a direct 
impact on the ability of a youthful offender to form intent: 
 
To be convicted of a crime in the United States, 
one supposedly must have the capacity to both 
know right from wrong and to control one’s 
behavior.  Those with a history of childhood abuse 
may know right from wrong, but their brains may 
be so irritable and the connections from the 
logical, rational hemispheres so weak that intense 
negative (right-hemisphere) emotions may 
incapacitate their use of logic and reason to 
control their aggressive impulses.  Is it just to hold 
people criminally responsible for acts they lack 
the neurological capacity to control?135 
 
 
130. Id. at 4-5 (“Limbic irritability [is] manifested by markedly increased 
prevalence of symptoms suggestive of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) and by an 
increased incidence of clinically significant EEG (brain wave) abnormalities.”). 
131. Id. at 5 (“[This process is] manifested throughout the cerebral cortex 
and the hippocampus, which is involved in memory retrieval.”). 
132. Id. at 6.  (“[This process is] indicated by marked shifts in hemispheric 
activity during memory recall and by underdevelopment of the middle portions 
of the corpus callosum, the primary pathway connecting the two 
hemispheres.”). 
133. Id.  (“[This] appears to play an important role in emotional and 
attentional balance and regulates electrical activity within the limbic 
system.”). 
134. Id.  (“Cells in the hippocampus have an unusually large number of 
receptors that respond to the stress hormone cortisol.  Since animal studies 
show that exposure to high levels of stress hormones like cortisol has toxic 
effects on the developing hippocampus, this brain region may be adversely 
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While studies demonstrate that every child’s brain develops 
differently, and that such development directly impacts the 
child’s ability to form intent and, ultimately, the appropriate 
punishment for the child’s offense, the decision about whether to 
transfer a case to adult court is often made by a prosecutor who 
knows only the facts of the crime.  As shown below, the Eighth 
Amendment requires that all relevant factors—including 
cognitive functioning, brain development, child abuse and 
neglect, educational neglect, mental illness, and many others 
unique to each child’s case—must be considered by a neutral 
trier of fact before a child is adjudicated delinquent of a serious 
offense with no opportunity to expunge her record in the future. 
The concept of mitigation derives largely from the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in death penalty 
cases.  The Court has described the concept of mitigation and its 
relevance in capital sentencing proceedings many times.136  In 
 
136.  
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital 
case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.   We 
recognize that, in noncapital cases, the established practice 
of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional 
commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes.  The 
considerations that account for the wide acceptance of 
individualization of sentences in noncapital cases surely 
cannot be thought less important in capital cases.  Given that 
the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly 
different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the 
conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in 
capital cases.  The need for treating each defendant in a 
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of 
the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.  
A variety of flexible techniques-probation, parole, work 
furloughs, to name a few-and various postconviction 
remedies may be available to modify an initial sentence of 
confinement in noncapital cases.  The nonavailability of 
corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an 
executed capital sentence underscores the need for 
individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement 
in imposing the death sentence.  There is no perfect 
procedure for deciding in which cases governmental 
authority should be used to impose death.  But a statute that 
prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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determining that differences in brain function preclude children 
from being executed and from serving life without parole for a 
non-homicide, the Supreme Court intent and, ultimately, the 
appropriate punishment for a child who is currently serving a 
life sentence. 
A review of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence demonstrates that it violates the constitutional 
requirement of proportionality to adjudicate an abused or 
mentally ill child delinquent of a serious offense without giving 
them the opportunity to have that charge expunged from their 
record in the future.  It is fundamental that “[a] punishment is 
‘excessive,’ and therefore prohibited by the [Eighth] 
Amendment, if it is not graduated and proportioned to the 
offense.”137  The Court determines if a punishment is excessive 
by reviewing “currently prevailing standards of decency.”138  In 
 
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's 
character and record and to circumstances of the offense 
proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty 
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less 
severe penalty.  When the choice is between life and death, 
that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the 
commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 512-13 (2003). 
 
The mitigating evidence counsel failed to discover and 
present here is powerful.  Wiggins experienced severe 
privation and abuse while in the custody of his alcoholic, 
absentee mother and physical torment, sexual molestation, 
and repeated rape while in foster care.  His time spent 
homeless and his diminished mental capacities further 
augment his mitigation case. He thus has the kind of troubled 
history relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability. 
 
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (“‘[E]vidence about the defendant's 
background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this 
society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a 
disadvantaged background . . . may be less culpable than defendants who have 
no such excuse’”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (noting that 
consideration of the offender's life history is a “‘part of the process of inflicting 
the penalty of death’”); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606 (invalidating Ohio law that did 
not permit consideration of aspects of a defendant's background). 
137. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002) (citing Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). 
138. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958). 
31
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determining whether a punishment violates the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court looks at whether the punishment is 
consistent with “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”139  In Atkins, the Court 
explained that “[p]roportionality review under such evolving 
standards should be informed by objective factors to the 
maximum possible extent, the clearest and most reliable of 
which is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”140  
However, it is important to note that the Court does not require 
state legislative action in order to determine that a punishment 
violates the Eighth Amendment: “[T]he Constitution 
contemplates that this Court will bring its own judgment to bear 
by asking whether there is reason to agree or disagree with the 
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”141 
 
 
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase ‘cruel and 
unusual’ has not been detailed by this Court. But the basic 
policy reflected in these words is firmly established in the 
Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice.  The phrase in 
our Constitution was taken directly from the English 
Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents 
can be traced back to the Magna Carta.  The basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the 
dignity of man.  While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised 
within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment 
and even execution may be imposed depending upon the 
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds 
of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.  This 
Court has had little occasion to give precise content to the 
Eighth Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy such 
as ours, this is not surprising.  But when the Court was 
confronted with a punishment of 12 years in irons at hard 
and painful labor imposed for the crime of falsifying public 
records, it did not hesitate to declare that the penalty was 
cruel in its excessiveness and unusual in its character.  The 
Court recognized in that case that the words of the 
Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static.  
The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
139. Id. at 101. 
140. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 (citations omitted). 
141. Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)). 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/5
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In Eddings v. Oklahoma,142 the Supreme Court recognized 
that youth is a mitigating factor that must be taken into account 
at sentencing in a capital case: 
 
All of this does not suggest an absence of 
responsibility for the crime of murder, 
deliberately committed in this case.  Rather, it is 
to say that just as the chronological age of a minor 
is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great 
weight, so must the background and mental and 
emotional development of a youthful defendant be 
duly considered in sentencing.143 
 
In 1989, the Supreme Court reversed a death sentence 
because the then-applicable jury instructions did not allow the 
jury to give effect to the compelling mitigating evidence 
presented of childhood trauma and intellectual disability.144  The 
Court explained the concept of mitigation: “‘[E]vidence about the 
defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the 
belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit 
criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged 
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less 
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.’”145  The 
court held that “‘the sentence imposed at the penalty stage 
 
142. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982). 
143. Id. at 116. 
 
Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity 
of an adult.  In this case, Eddings was not a normal 16-year-
old; he had been deprived of the care, concern, and paternal 
attention that children deserve.  On the contrary, it is not 
disputed that he was a juvenile with serious emotional 
problems, and had been raised in a neglectful, sometimes 
even violent, family background.  In addition, there was 
testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional development 
were at a level several years below his chronological age. 
 
Id. 
144. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1989), abrogated by 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
145. Id. at 319 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s 
background, character, and crime.’”146 
In Atkins, the court followed its reasoning in Penry I, and 
held that the Eighth Amendment precluded the imposition of the 
ultimate penalty on the intellectually disabled.  “Because of their 
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their 
impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral 
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal 
conduct.”147  In Roper v. Simmons, the Court recognized that this 
reasoning was directly applicable to juvenile offenders and held 
that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were 
under 18 at the time of the crime violates the Eighth 
Amendment: The “differences [between adults and juveniles 
under 18 years of age] render suspect any conclusion that a 
juvenile falls among the worst offenders.  The susceptibility of 
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their 
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of 
an adult.’”148  In language directly applicable to the argument 
that juvenile offenses should be expunged if they were the result 
of compelling mitigating circumstances, the Court stated in 
Roper that a “[juvenile’s] own vulnerability and comparative 
lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean 
juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for 
failing to escape negative influences in their whole 
environment.”149  The Court specifically noted that “‘[f]or most 
teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with 
maturity as individual identity becomes settled.  Only a 
relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in 
risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem 
behavior that persist into adulthood.”150 
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided that juvenile offenders 
cannot be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for a 
 
146. Id. 
147. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306. 
148. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (citing Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)). 
149. Id. at 553.  (emphasis added). 
150. Id. at 570 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less 
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished 
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non-homicide crime.151  The Court further elaborated on the 
difference between the culpability of juvenile and adult 
offenders: 
 
Roper established that because juveniles have 
lessened culpability they are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments.  As compared to adults, 
juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as well 
formed.’152 
 
In 2012, the Court continued this line of cases when it held 
that juvenile offenders cannot be subject to mandatory life 
imprisonment without parole even for a homicide.153  “Roper and 
Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth 
diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest 
sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible 
crimes.”154 
As one of the leading neurobiologists to study the behavior 
of adolescents has explained, the link between child abuse and 
delinquent behavior is well-documented. 
 
[E]arly maltreatment, even exclusively 
psychological abuse, has enduring negative effects 
on brain development.  We see specific kinds of 
brain abnormalities in psychiatric patients who 
were abused as children.  We are also beginning 
to understand how these abnormalities may 
account directly for the personality traits and 
other symptoms that patients manifest. . . . 
Physical, sexual, and psychological trauma in 
childhood may lead to psychiatric difficulties that 
show up in childhood, adolescence, or adulthood.  
 
151. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
152. Id. at 68 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70). 
153. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
154. Id. at 2458. 
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The victim’s anger, shame and despair can be 
directed inward to spawn symptoms such as 
depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and post-
traumatic stress, or directed outward as 
aggression, impulsiveness, delinquency, 
hyperactivity, and substance abuse.155 
 
Other experts have documented the impact of toxic stress 
on the developing brain.156  “Early experiences determine 
whether a child’s developing brain architecture provides a 
strong or weak foundation for all future learning, behavior, and 
health.”157  Exposure to what experts describe as “toxic stress” 
often associated with abuse and socio-economic deprivation can 
have lifelong negative effects on a developing brain.158  
Psychologists describe toxic stress as follows: 
 
Toxic stress, is associated with strong and pro-
longed activation of the body’s stress response 
systems in the absence of the buffering protection 
of adult support.  Stressors include recurrent child 
abuse or neglect, severe maternal depression, 
parental substance abuse, or family violence.  
Under such circumstances, persistent elevations 
of stress hormones and altered levels of key brain 
chemicals produce an internal physiological state 
that disrupts the architecture and chemistry of 
the developing brain.159 
 
Studies of at-risk children conclude that “[c]urrent 
knowledge about brain and child development, as well as 
empirical data from cost-benefit studies, presents a compelling 
case for early public investments targeted toward children who 
 
155. Teicher, supra note 17, at 1-2. 
156. See HARVARD UNIVERSITY CTR ON DEV. CHILD, A SCIENCE-BASED 
FRAMEWORK FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD POL’Y: USING EVIDENCE TO IMPROVE 
OUTCOMES LEARNING, BEHAV., & HEALTH FOR VULNERABLE CHILD. (2007). 
157. Id. at 2. 
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are at greatest risk for failure in school, in the workplace, and in 
society at large.”160 
Studies on the impact of abuse and socio-economic 
deprivation on the brain development and behavior of at-risk 
youth support the argument that it is fundamentally unjust to 
hold these young people accountable for behavior that results, in 
large part, from factors that are beyond their control.  Allowing 
youth who present significant mitigation to have juvenile 
charges expunged from their records if they complete 
appropriate programs and demonstrate improved behavior both 
benefits society and incentivizes positive behavior by the youth.  
The Supreme Court, in addressing the application of the death 
penalty and sentences of life without parole for juveniles, has 
recognized that the harshest punishments are not appropriate 
for those whose brains are still developing and who have no 
choice as to their living circumstances.  The same reasoning 
applies to the lifelong consequences of a juvenile adjudication of 
delinquency.  If a fourteen-year old follows her friends and 
participates in the burglary of a dwelling, all reasonable people 
can agree that serious consequences should follow.  Under 
current law, if the youth completes probation and any required 
programs and does not get into further trouble, the felony will 
remain on her record for the rest of her life thus precluding many 
opportunities. 
The Supreme Court found juvenile life without parole and 
the juvenile death penalty violative of the Eighth Amendment 
on proportionality grounds.  The notion that the life of a teenager 
will be forever limited because of a split-second decision made at 
fourteen not only violates the Eighth Amendment, it harms 
society.  Allowing youth who demonstrate compelling mitigating 
circumstances to expunge their records would incentivize 
positive behavior by at-risk youth and benefit society. 
 
 
160. Id. at 28. 
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